Traditional Risk Management | ERM |
Risk is viewed in business line, risk-type, and functional silos | Risk viewed across business lines, functions, and risk types, looking at diversification and concentration |
Risk managers work in isolation | Risk team integrated using global risk management committee and chief risk officer |
Incorporates many different risk metrics that cannot be compared | |
Risk is aggregated, if at all, within business lines and risk types. Difficulty seeing the aggregate risk picture |
It is possible to measure risks more accurately and track enterprise risk. Potentially, risk is aggregated across multiple risk types. |
Each risk type is managed using risk-specific transfer instruments | Possibility of cutting risk transfer costs firm-wide and integrated (e.g., multi-trigger) instruments to manage aggregate risk. |
Each risk management approach is often treated separately, without optimizing the strategy. |
Each risk management approach is viewed as a component of total cost of risk, measured in a single currency. Component choice is optimized as far as possible in risk/reward and cost/benefit terms expressed in that currency. |
Impossible to integrate the management and transfer of risk with balance sheet management and financing strategies |
Risk management is increasingly integrated with balance sheet management, capital management, and financing strategies. |
Board’s Overall Responsibilities | The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing management’s implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives, governance framework and corporate culture. |
Board Qualifications and Compensation | Board members should be and remain qualified, individually and collectively, for their positions. They should understand their oversight and corporate governance role and be able to exercise sound, objective judgement about the affairs of the bank. |
Board’s Own Structure and Practices | The board should define appropriate governance structures and practices for its own work and put in place the means for such practices to be followed and periodically reviewed for ongoing effectiveness. |
Senior Management | Under the direction and oversight of the board, senior management should carry out and manage the bank’s activities in a manner consistent with the business strategy, risk appetite, remuneration, and other policies approved by the board. |
Governance of Group Structures | In a group structure, the board of the parent firm has the overall responsibility for the group and for ensuring the establishment and operation of a clear governance framework appropriate to the structure, business, and risks of the group and its entities. The board and senior management should know and understand the bank group’s organizational structure and the risks that it poses. |
Risk Management Function | Banks should have an effective independent risk management function, under the direction of a chief risk officer (CRO), with sufficient stature, independence, resources, and access to the board. |
Risk Identification, Monitoring, and Controlling | Risks should be identified, monitored, and controlled on an ongoing bank-wide and individual entity basis. The sophistication of the bank’s risk management and internal control infrastructure should keep pace with changes to the bank’s risk profile, the external risk landscape, and to industry practice. |
Risk Communication | An effective risk governance framework requires robust communication within the bank about risk, both across the organization and through reporting to the board and senior management. |
Compliance | The bank’s board of directors is responsible for overseeing the management of the bank’s compliance risk. The board should establish a compliance function and approve the bank’s policies and processes for identifying, assessing, monitoring, reporting, and advising on compliance risk. |
Internal Audit | The internal audit function should provide independent assurance to the board and should support the board and senior management in promoting an effective governance process and the long-term soundness of the bank. |
Compensation | The bank’s remuneration structure should support sound corporate governance and risk management. |
Disclosure and Transparency | The governance of the bank should be adequately transparent to its shareholders, depositors, other relevant stakeholders, and market participants. |
Role of Supervisors | Supervisors should provide guidance for and supervise corporate governance at banks, including through comprehensive evaluations and regular interaction with boards and senior management; should require improvement and remedial action as necessary; and should share information on corporate governance with other supervisors. |
ERM Dimension | Examples |
Targets | Enterprise goals: Enterprise risk appetite, enterprise limit frameworks, risk-sensitive business goals and strategy formulation |
Structure | How ERM is organized – Board risk oversight, global risk committee, Risk Officer; ERM subcommittee; reporting lines for ERM; reporting structures |
Metrics | How enterprise risk is measured – Enterprise-level risk metrics, enterprise stress testing, aggregate risk measures, “total cost of risk” approaches, enterprise level risk mapping and flagging, choice of enterprise-level risk limit metrics |
ERM Strategies | How ERM is managed – Enterprise level risk transfer strategies, enterprise risk transfer instruments, enterprise monitoring of business line management of enterprise scale risks |
Culture | How things are done – “tone at the top”, accountability for key enterprise risks, openness and effective challenge, risk-aligned compensation, staff risk literacy, whistle-blowing mechanisms. |
Indicator | Trend Tracking |
Leadership Tone | Does board and executive compensation support the firm’s core values? Do management’s actions support or undermine the risk message? Can the board be shown to monitor and communicate how business strategy fits with risk appetite? |
Accountability and Risk Monitoring | Are there clear expectations on monitoring and accountability for key risks? Are escalation processes used? |
Openness and Effective Challenge | Is there evidence that opposing views from individuals are valued? Are there regular assessments of “openness to dissent?” Is risk management given stature? |
Risk-Aligned Compensation | Are compensation and performance metrics supportive of the firm’s risk appetite and desired culture? |
Risk Appetite Knowledge | Do key staff members know the firm’s enterprise risk appetite? Can they answer straightforward questions about its application to business decisions? |
Risk Literacy/Common Language | Do staff use a common language to describe risk and its effects? Are training programs available and attended? |
Risk Information Flows | Can the firm see information flowing up and across the firm in a way that captures and highlights enterprise-scale risks? And is there a clear link to specific discussions and decisions? |
Risk Stature | Do the key ERM staff have the right stature and direct communication with the Board? Who hires and fires them? |
Escalation and Whistle Blowing | Do key staff members understand when and how they can escalate a suspected enterprise risk? When were escalation procedures last used? Is there a whistle-blowing mechanism and is it used? |
Board Risk Priorities | Can the board name the top ten enterprise risks faced by the firm? Can it name the key industry disasters associated with these risks? |
Action Against Risk Offenders | Has the firm disciplined employees who have acted against its risk appetite and ethical stance? Does the staff believe action will be taken even if a risk violation leads to a profit rather than a loss? |
Risk Incident and Near Miss Responses | Can the firm show how it has identified culture issues in risk incidents and the measures taken in response? |
External Drivers—Examples |
Economic cycles (e.g., credit cycle, industry cycle) |
Industry practices/guidelines |
Professional standards |
Regulatory standards |
Country risk/corruption indices |
Advantages | Disadvantages |
No need to consider risk frequency beyond “plausibility” |
Difficult to gauge the probability of events; does not lead to the quantification of risk |
Scenarios can take the form of transparent and intuitive narratives. |
Unfolding scenarios can become complex with many choices. |
Challenges firms to imagine the worst and gauge the effects |
Firms may not stretch their imaginations (e.g., scenarios might underestimate the impact of an extreme loss event or omit important risk exposures). |
Can allow firms to focus on their key exposures, key risk types, and the ways in which risk develops over time |
Only a limited number of scenarios can be fully developed—are they the right ones? |
Allows firms to identify warning signals and build contingency plans |
Are they the right warnings and plans, given the scenario selection challenge? |
Does not depend on historical data; can be based around either historical events or forward-looking hypothetical events |
The scenarios chosen are often prompted by the last major crisis; imaginative future scenarios may be dismissed as improbable. |
Firms can make scenario analysis as sophisticated or straightforward as they like, outside regulator-defined programs. |
Scenario analyses vary in terms of quality and sophistication. Their credibility and assumptions can be difficult to assess. |
Stress test results can influence risk appetite, risk limits, and capital adequacy. |
Usefulness depends on accuracy, comprehensiveness, and the forward-looking qualities of the firm’s stress test program. |
Historical Credit Scenarios—Examples |
1997 – Asian crisis |
1998 – Russian debt moratorium |
2001 – 9/11 market effects |
2007 – US subprime debt crisis |
2008 – Lehman Brothers counterparty crisis |
2010 – European sovereign debt crisis |