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The Evolution Of Stress Testing Counterparty Exposures

Instructor  Micky Midha
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Learning Objectives

  • Differentiate among current exposure, peak exposure, expected exposure, and expected positive exposure.
  • Explain the treatment of counterparty credit risk (CCR) both as a credit risk and as a market risk and describe its implications for trading activities and risk management for a financial institution.
  • Describe a stress test that can be performed on a loan portfolio and on a derivative portfolio.
  • Calculate the stressed expected loss, the stress loss for the loan portfolio, and the stress loss on a derivative portfolio.
  • Describe a stress test that can be performed on CVA.
  • Calculate the stressed CVA and the stress loss on CVA.
  • Calculate the debt value adjustment (DVA) and explain how stressing DVA enters into aggregating stress tests of CCR.
  • Describe the common pitfalls in stress testing CCR.
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Introduction

  • The handling and oversight of counterparty credit risk (CCR) have seen rapid development since the late 1990s. While there have been significant advancements in statistical measures for CCR, stress testing in this domain hasn’t progressed as swiftly.
  • The evolution of CCR assessment methods illustrates this swift transformation. Initially, potential-exposure models emerged to gauge and restrict counterparty risk. These models then evolved into expected positive-exposure models, enabling derivatives to be included in portfolio credit risk models akin to loans. Both models underline the treatment of CCR as a form of credit risk..
  • From 2000 to 2006, treating CCR as credit risk was the dominant framework for its measurement and management. It formed the foundation for regulatory capital under Basel II (BCBS 2005). The exposure measures defined in the following section align with those outlined in BCBS (2005).

Definitions

  • Current exposure is the larger of zero and the market value of a transaction or portfolio of transactions within a netting set, with a counterparty that would be lost upon the default of the counterparty, assuming no recovery on the value of those transactions in bankruptcy. Current exposure is often also called replacement cost.
  • Peak exposure is a high-percentile (typically 95% or 99%) of the distribution of exposures at any particular future date before the maturity date of the longest transaction in the netting set. A peak exposure value is typically generated for many future dates up until the longest maturity date of transactions in the netting set.
  • Expected exposure is the mean of the distribution of exposures at any particular future date before the longest-maturity transaction in the netting set matures. An expected exposure value is generated for many future dates up to the longest maturity date of transactions in the netting set.
  • Expected positive exposure (EPE) is the weighted average over time of expected exposures where the weights are the proportion that an individual expected exposure represents of the entire time interval. When calculating the minimum capital requirement, the average is taken over the first year or over the time period of the longest-maturity contract in the netting set.
    Wrong-way risk is a notable concern within Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR), characterized by the situation where the exposure to a counterparty increases simultaneously with the elevated likelihood of that counterparty defaulting. It’s essential to note that wrong-way risk is not a factor in fixed-rate loans.

Treatment Of CCR As Credit And Market Risk

  • While Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) has historically been categorized under credit risk, the consideration of CCR as a market risk started evolving in the 1990s. Its treatment as a market risk was primarily confined to factoring in a credit valuation adjustment (CVA) before the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
  • The complexities of risk-managing this price aspect of a derivatives portfolio did not become apparent until the crisis. Prior to the crisis, credit spreads for financial institutions were relatively stable and the CVA was a small portion of the valuation of banks’ derivatives portfolios. During the crisis, both credit spreads and exposure amounts for derivative transactions experienced wide swings, and the combined effect resulted in both large losses and large, unusual gains.
  • The classification of CCR as either credit risk or market risk significantly impacts how a financial institution organizes its trading activities and risk management strategies. While both approaches are valid for portfolio management, adhering to only one perspective exposes the institution to risks associated with the other viewpoint.
    • Under the credit risk perspective, a bank may still face exposure to CVA fluctuations. Overlooking this aspect could lead to unexpected imbalances in the balance sheet.
    • On the other hand, treating CCR as a market risk and dynamically hedging CVA to mitigate market risk losses doesn’t fully safeguard against significant drops in creditworthiness or sudden counterparty defaults.
      Consequently, derivatives dealers are compelled to consider and manage both aspects.
  • Furthermore, these differing views of CCR impact how risks are managed.
    • The traditional credit risk view suggests managing counterparty credit risk at inception or through pre-arranged collateral agreements, with limited options once trades are in place. Upon default, replacing the trades of the defaulting counterparty in the market becomes necessary to rebalance the book, emphasizing risk mitigants and credit evaluation.
    • In contrast, the market risk view allows hedging of counterparty credit risk. Instead of waiting for default, trades are proactively replaced based on the counterparty’s default probability, potentially minimizing impact. At default, the institution already replaces trades, rendering the default itself less disruptive.
  • The dual nature of CCR leads to many measures that capture some important aspects of CCR.
    • On the credit risk side, there are the important measures of exposure: current exposure, peak exposure and expected exposure. 
    • On the market risk side there is the valuation aspect coming from CVA, and there is the risk generated by changes in the CVA, as measured by VaR of CVA, for example.
      This array of information, difficult to interpret and understand, exists at both portfolio and counterparty levels. The quest for a concise understanding of counterparty credit risk is challenging, compounded by the complexity of determining stressed CCR measures.
  • Stress testing for CCR becomes complex due to multiple risk measures. For instance, in market risk, running an equity crash stress test results in one or two stress numbers. However, in CCR, this necessitates running such stress tests both at the portfolio and counterparty levels, considering CCR from both credit and market risk perspectives. This substantially multiplies the number of stress-test results and can overwhelm risk managers and IT resources.
  • Despite this complexity, stress testing counterparty exposures is essential for a comprehensive view of the financial institution’s portfolio risk.

    Stress Testing Of Exposures

    • Common stress tests in counterparty credit often revolve around current exposure. To stress the current value, banks simulate scenarios involving changes in underlying risk factors and reprice the portfolio accordingly. Typically, financial institutions implement these stress tests for each counterparty.
    • Banks commonly present their leading counterparties showing the highest current exposure to senior management within a single table. Following this, they provide separate tables for each scenario, highlighting the top counterparties with the greatest stressed current exposure.
      Current Exposure Stress TEST: Equity Crash
      USD in millions Scenario: Equity Market Down 25%
      Rating MtM Collateral Current Exposure Stressed Current Exposure
      Counterparty A A 0.5 0 0.5 303
      Counterparty B AA 100 0 100 220
      Counterparty C AA 35 0 35 119
      Counterparty D BBB 20 20 0 76
      Counterparty E BBB 600 600 0 75
      Counterparty F A -5 0 0 68
    • The above  table provides an example of a financial institution’s report on its equity crash stress test for current exposure. It displays the top 10 counterparties based on their exposure to a 25% equity market crash. The categories include counterparty rating, trade market value (marked-to-market, MtM), collateral, current exposure, and stressed current exposure post-stress but before collecting any collateral.
      • Such stress testing is valuable as it helps identify concerning counterparties during stress events and determines the potential amount owed by a counterparty to the institution under specific scenarios. However, stress tests focusing on current exposure encounter a few limitations: 
        • Aggregation of the results is problematic – While individual counterparty results hold significance, combining these stress exposures without additional data lacks meaningfulness. Summing up exposures to create an aggregate stress exposure would portray an exaggerated loss scenario, assuming every counterparty defaults – a scenario far beyond realistic events. Other attempts to aggregate these results also face flaws. For instance, processing stressed current exposure through a portfolio credit risk model would be inaccurate, as portfolio credit risk models should ideally incorporate expected exposures, not current exposures.
        • It does not account for the credit quality of the counterparties – Only the value of trades with the counterparty is considered, neglecting the counterparty’s willingness or ability to pay. This deficiency is significant as a $200 million exposure to a startup hedge fund differs greatly from the same exposure to an AAA-rated corporate entity.
        • It provides no information on wrong-way risk – Stress tests of current exposure offer minimal insight into wrong-way risk. These stress tests, lacking information on credit quality, cannot identify the correlation between exposure and credit quality.
          Hence, it can be stated that stresses of current exposure are useful for monitoring individual counterparty exposures but fail to provide a portfolio outlook or integrate credit quality considerations.

        Stress Loss For Loan Portfolios

        • Expected loss for any one counterparty is the product of the probability of default, \(PD_i\), where this may depend on other variables, exposure at default, \(EAD_i\), and loss-given default, \(LGD_i\). The expected loss for the pool of loan counterparties is given by :

          \(EL = \sum_{i=1}^{N} PD_i \times EAD_i \times LGD_i\) …(A)

          A stress test could take exposure at default and loss-given default as deterministic and focus on stresses where the probability of default itself is subject to a stress. In this case, the probability of default is taken to be a function of other variables; these variables may represent an important exchange rate or an unemployment rate, for example. In this case, the stressed expected loss is calculated conditional on some of the variables affecting the probability of default being set to their stressed values; the stressed probability of default is denoted ps.; and the stressed expected loss is:

          \(EL_s = \sum_{i=1}^{N} PD_i^s \times EAD_i \times LGD_i\) …(B)

          The stress loss for the loan portfolio is determined as 𝐸𝐿_𝑠−𝐸𝐿. Financial institutions can conduct stress tests by adjusting default probabilities or stressing the variables affecting these probabilities, typically macroeconomic or counterparty balance-sheet indicators. These stress tests can be conducted for individual loan counterparts and at an aggregated level.

          Stress Loss On Derivatives Portfolio

          • EL and ELS calculations for derivatives portfolios resemble those for loans, using PD and LGD. However, instead of the stochastic EAD, which is influenced by market factors, it utilizes the Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) multiplied by an alpha factor (α). This adjustment integrates Counterparty Credit Risk into the portfolio credit model. Thus, the computation for EL and ELs for derivatives portfolios is as follows:

            \(EL = \sum_{i=1}^{N} PD_i \times \alpha \times EPE_i \times LGD_i \quad \text{and} \quad EL_s = \sum_{i=1}^{N} PD_i^s \times \alpha \times EPE_i \times LGD_i\)

          • Stress losses for derivatives portfolios can be calculated where institutions can stress the probability of default or its influencing variables, such as company balance-sheet values, macroeconomic indicators, and financial instrument values, similar to loans. Combining stress losses from both portfolios is feasible by aggregating these losses. Moreover, there are additional variables to stress in derivatives portfolios, like EPE, which is  linked to market variables like equity prices and swap rates. The impact of these stresses on expected losses is uncertain and may vary based on factors like portfolio directionality, margined counterparties, and excess margin. This contrasts with loan portfolios, where stresses on default probabilities tend to have uniform directional effects across counterparties. Consequently, when stressing EPE, aggregation with loan portfolios isn’t necessary, as loans aren’t influenced by market variables and won’t change exposure due to market shifts.
          • A financial institution usually employs instantaneous shocks on market variables, primarily focusing on shocks to current exposure. These shocks involve altering the initial market value of derivatives before calculating EPE. The impact of such shocks on EPE relies on factors like collateralization and portfolio moneyness.
          • Moreover, institutions may apply simultaneous stresses on credit quality and market variables. Although conceptually straightforward, aligning changes in macroeconomic or balance-sheet variables with market shifts can be challenging. Equity-based approaches offer some connection, but the concurrence of an exposure shock with equity-based default probabilities remains uncertain.
          • It’s also difficult to capture the connection between the probability of default and exposure that is often of concern in CCR. There are many attempts to capture the wrong-way risk, but most are ad hoc. At present the best approach to identifying wrong-way risk in the credit framework is to stress the current exposure, identify those counterparties that are most exposed to the stress and then carefully consider whether the counterparty is also subject to wrong-way risk.
          • Stress tests of CCR as a credit risk allow a financial institution to advance beyond simple stresses of current exposure. They allow aggregation of losses with loan portfolios, and also allow consideration of the quality of the counterparty. These are important improvements that allow a financial institution to better manage its portfolio of derivatives. Treating CCR as a market risk allows further improvements (notably, the probability of default will be inferred from market variables), and it will be easier to consider joint stresses of credit quality and exposure.

          Stress Testing CVA

          • In stress testing CCR within a market risk framework, focus lies on the market value of the counterparty credit risk and potential losses stemming from market variable fluctuations, such as changes in the counterparty’s credit spread.
            • Typically, unilateral CVA is considered by financial institutions for stress testing, involving concerns about potential counterparty defaults across diverse market scenarios.
            • When considering the potential for their own default to counterparties, financial institutions should consider stress testing bilateral CVA.
          • A common simplified formula for CVA to a counterparty that omits wrong-way risk, and aggregated across N counterparties is given as

            where
            \(LGD_n^*\) is the risk-neutral loss-given default for counterparty
            \(EE_n^*(t_j)\) is the discounted expected exposure during the 𝑗th time period calculated under a risk-neutral measure for counterparty 𝑛.
            \(PD_n^*(t_{j-1}, t_j)\) is the risk-neutral marginal default probability for counterparty 𝑛 in the time interval from 𝑡j-1  and 𝑡j , and
            𝑇 is the final maturity
          • The constituents of the previous formula are dependent on market variables. In particular,
            • \(EE_n^*(t_j)\) depends on the values of derivative transactions with the counterparty.
            • \(LGD_n^*\) is generally set by convention or from market spreads
            • \(PD_n^*(t_{j-1}, t_j)\) is derived from credit spreads of the counterparty
          • The stressed CVA is computed by introducing instantaneous shocks to certain variables, impacting both the risk-neutral discounted expected exposure, \(EE_n^*(t_j)\), and the risk-neutral marginal default probability,\(PD_n^*(t_{j-1}, t_j)\). The formula for the stressed CVA is given by

            \(CVA^s = \sum_{i=1}^{N} LGD_n^* \times \sum_{j=1}^{T} EE_n^s(t_j) \times PD_n^s(t_{j-1}, t_j)\)

            and the stress loss is
            \(CVA^s – CVA\)
          • Comparing stress testing methodologies between CCR in credit risk and market risk frameworks reveals similarity in relying on expected losses, calculated as the product of loss-given default, exposure, and probability of default.
          • However, these values will be quite different, depending on the view of CCR as a market risk or credit risk. This can be because of the following reasons:
            • Usage of risk-neutral values for CVA as opposed to physical values for expected losses.
            • CVA uses expected losses over the life of the transactions, whereas expected losses use a specified time horizon.
            • The model used to determine the probability of default leans towards market-based approaches in CVA. The market-based approach is advantageous because it enables correlation integration between exposure and PD, which significantly affects the CVA. However, due to the uncertainty of correlation, financial institutions should conduct stress tests to assess the impact of incorrect correlation assumptions on profit and loss.
          • For a comprehensive assessment of the impact of different scenarios on CVA profit and loss, financial institutions should incorporate the liability side effects in stress tests. This component, known as DVA within bilateral CVA (BCVA), evaluates the value associated with the institution’s option to default on counterparties.

          Stress Testing CVA and DVA

          • Using a market-based measure for the probability of default provides some benefits. It is possible in these circumstances to incorporate a correlation between the probability of default and the exposure. Hull and White (2012) demonstrate an important stress test of the correlation between exposure and the probability of default. They show that the correlation can have an important effect on the measured CVA. Since there is likely to be a high degree of uncertainty around the correlation, a financial institution should runstress tests to determine the impact on profit and loss if the correlation is wrong.
          • To capture the full impact of various scenarios on CVA profit and loss, a financial institution should include the liability side effects in the stress as well. This part of the bilateral CVA (BCVA), often called DVA, captures the value of the financial institution’s option to default on its counterparties.

          Stress Testing DVA

          • The DVA formula parallels the CVA formula with two key modifications.
            • Firstly, instead of expected exposure, the calculation involves determining the negative expected exposure (NEE), which is computed from the counterparty’s standpoint.
            • Secondly, the financial institution’s option value to default is contingent upon the counterparty’s survival, requiring incorporation of the counterparty’s survival probability (denoted by SI in the computation.
          • Similarly, adjustments are made to the CVA segment, as the loss arising from the counterparty default relies on the financial institution not defaulting prior. Hence, the bilateral CVA (BCVA) formula can be written as :

            \(BCVA = \sum_{i=1}^{N} LGD_n^* \times \sum_{j=1}^{T} EE_n^*(t_j) \times PD_n^*(t_{j-1}, t_j) \times S_i^*(t_{j-1})\)

            \(\sum_{i=1}^{N} LGD_l^* \times \sum_{j=1}^{T} NEE_n^*(t_j) \times PD_l^*(t_{j-1}, t_j) \times S_n^*(t_{j-1})\)

            where the subscript I refers to the financial institution.

          • Survival probabilities are influenced by CDS spreads, and losses now hinge on the firm’s credit spread. This dynamic could yield unexpected outcomes, like losses occurring despite improvements in the firm’s credit quality.
          • From a bilateral standpoint in stress testing, the financial institution must also assess the correlation between its own credit spread and those of its counterparties. Stress losses can be computed akin to CVA losses by determining a stress BCVA and deducting the current BCVA.
          • BCVA allows CCR to be treated as a market risk. This means CCR can be incorporated into market risk stress testing in a coherent manner. The gains or losses from the BCVA stress loss can be added to the firm’s stress tests from market risk. As long as the same shocks to market variables are applied to the trading portfolio and to the BCVA results, they can be aggregated by simple addition.

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